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1 ABSTRACT 
In contemporary cryptographic systems, secret keys are usually exchanged by means 
of methods, which suffer from mathematical and technology inherent drawbacks. That 
could lead to unnoticed complete compromise of cryptographic systems, without a 
chance of control by its legitimate owners.  
Therefore a need for innovative solutions exists when truly and reliably secure 
transmission of secrets is required for dealing with critical data and applications. 
Quantum Cryptography (QC), in particular Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) can 
answer that need.  
The business white paper (BWP) summarizes how secret key establishment and 
distribution problems can be solved by quantum cryptography. It deals with several 
considerations related to how the quantum cryptography innovation could contribute 
to provide business effectiveness. It addresses advantages and also limitations of 
quantum cryptography, proposes a scenario case study, and invokes standardization 
related issues. In addition, it answers most frequently asked questions about quantum 
cryptography.  
 
Keywords 
Information security; Secrets management; Data confidentiality, Long-term security; 
Quantum Cryptography; Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Quantum Cryptography 
Standardization; Business applications, Business effectiveness and competitiveness.  
 
The aims of this white paper are to: 
• explain the innovation produced by the SECOQC consortium related to quantum 
cryptography for secure information transmission; 
• promote the use of quantum cryptography by describing the business 
advantages of integrating such mechanisms and quantum networks in existing 
telecommunication architecture; 
• facilitate decision making processes for adoption of quantum cryptography 
solutions by business managers for the benefit of public or private institutions; 
• raise public awareness of the possible use of the application of quantum 
cryptography to enhance actual cryptographic security mechanisms. 
 
SECOQC Business White Paper addresses quantum cryptography 
business related issues. Consequently, it does not give mathematical 
or physical details of classical or quantum cryptography. The reader 
does not need to have a mathematical, physical, computer science or 
telecommunication background. 
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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Offering a good level of data confidentiality is nowadays becoming an important 
feature for business realisation and competitiveness. SECOQC provides a tool 
based on quantum cryptography that will enable organisations to exchange critical 
information with guaranteed confidentiality, knowing that their vital informational 
assets are secure from industrial espionage and other forms of illegal activities.  
Quantum cryptography provides long-term security and thus conforms to the 
requirements of a number of recent legal regulations for protecting information. 
For any institution, as for examples financial entities, governments, military agencies, 
airports or critical infrastructures as power stations, etc., the necessity for secure 
communication takes highest priority when the exchanged information is considered 
as critical. For such institutions a security breach in the transmitted information could 
be a disaster that could not be covered by insurance mechanisms. 
Contemporary commercial cryptographic solutions are not provably secure, because 
of their intrinsic vulnerabilities. Thus, the main component of secure transmission 
of confidential data, the cryptographic key, cannot be considered as totally secure. 
Methods and systems considered as acceptably secure today have a significant risk 
of becoming weak tomorrow.  
Since the recent past, quantum cryptography has only been carried out in 
experimental projects. Only physical scientists were interested in quantum information 
theory. Nowadays this is evolving and more and more information security 
specialists focus on the practical utilisation of quantum cryptography to 
increase the security level of confidential data transmission.  
Quantum cryptography is no more a subject reserved to scientific conferences for 
physics experts; it is becoming an alternative solution meeting the real needs of 
demanding users. Innovation in optical technologies makes it possible by providing 
the market with devices capable of generating, detecting and guiding single photons; 
devices that are affordable within a commercial environment. They can be integrated 
in existing telecommunication architectures to enforce data communication 
security. As demonstrate by SECOQC, it is possible to use them to design point-to-
point links, virtual private networks or telecommunication networks. 
Quantum cryptography offers effective cryptographic mechanisms without passing by 
a third party or a certification authority as requested when using a public key 
infrastructure (PKI). In existing highest-security cryptography systems, cryptographic 
keys have to be distributed beforehand, which is a weakness of these system. 
Quantum cryptography brings an efficient solution to generate, manage and 
transmit the cryptographic keys in a very secure way. 
Quantum key establishment and distribution processes reach the highest level 
of security guarantee because they rely upon laws of physics independent from 
the time variable and will never be threatened by increased computing power or by 
progress made in mathematical discipline. 
In addition, quantum technology is now available to manufacture true random 
number generators. This is of the greatest interest to avoid predictable and 
deterministic computer behaviour and prevent several types of attacks against 
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cryptographic systems. Quantum cryptography has been developed to be secure 
against a wide range of attacks; whatever is the computer power a malevolent can 
rely upon. 
Any organisation using quantum cryptography, which is an inherently secure way to 
communicate secrets, would not be anymore at the same level of insecurity as its 
competitors. Quantum cryptography brings a real competitive and reputation 
advantage. 
Rethinking fundamentals in cryptography is the only solution to develop a new 
vision of security for the benefit of transactions that are critical for institutions and 
people. 
With quantum cryptography, institutions and people have for the first time the means 
to be sure that their data are under their own control and cannot be obtained by 
eavesdroppers without knowledge of sender or recipient. 
Today, quantum cryptography solutions are available to build secure 
communication infrastructures. 
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3 THE EUROPEAN PROJECT SECOQC  
Facing the challenge of transforming the European Union into the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, the European Commission has 
procured the sixth framework programme (FP6) fund, available for research, divided 
into seven European Research Areas (ERA). The integrated project SECOQC fits into 
the Information Society Technologies area. SECOQC, being the acronym for 
"Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography", was launched to 
contribute to evolve quantum cryptography into an instrument that can be operated in 
an economic competitive environment [1]. 
To put all the chances on SECOQC's side to reach scientific excellence, improved 
competitiveness and innovation, the consortium has been composed of different 
European institutions with several complementary fields of expertise and 
competences. All in all 42 partners are involved in this European project, and they 
work hand in hand to propose an effective information security solution. These 
various backgrounds enable the project and its completeness to be considered from 
all points of views. A wide range from conceptual and pragmatic issues belonging to 
quantum physics, to network architecture, to legal issues and to socio-economics 
impacts of new technology adoption, has been addressed in this project. 
SECOQC's aim is to provide companies and public institutions with an urgent need of 
confidential communication with an efficient instrument that qualitatively improves 
security levels of information transmission via public channels. Therefore the goal is 
to design a network for secure long-range communication building upon a Quantum 
Key Distribution (QKD) enabling technology. For that, the co-operation within 
SECOQC is divided into two main activity blocks: one covering the quantum physical 
devices and the other the design and set up of the communication infrastructure 
(cryptographic protocols, communication network, and system integration, in 
accordance to user requirements).  
Through increased co-operation, greater complementarities and improved co-
ordination between relevant actors at all levels of the consortium, great results have 
been achieved to resolve security and trust problems for quantum cryptography 
technology. Results have been presented to the international scientific community 
through publications, international conferences and symposiums. The first live 
demonstration of a working quantum key distribution network will take place in 
Vienna in the framework of the SECOQC Demonstration and International 
Conference (Oct. 8-10, 2008). Many awards, prizes and best papers have been 
awarded to the researchers for the quality and the relevance of their contributions. 
 
4 INFORMATION SECURITY FOR INSTITUTIONS’ EFFECTIVENESS AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 
4.1 Need for strong information confidentiality 
The more valuable information is the more eavesdroppers will be motivated to find out 
how to reach and exploit it. Even data intrinsically and individually considered as non-
critical could become critical when being accurately correlated, in regards of 
economical and industrial espionage related issues. Currently, unauthorised third 
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parties routinely and systematically attack communication and data transmission over 
public networks, and put in danger data confidentiality and integrity. 
Electronic surveillance systems, blended with massive computing power render 
almost any "plain text" or encrypted communication completely vulnerable. While 
electronic surveillance systems currently do not have the cryptanalytic power to 
endanger strong encryption, attempts are made to subvert strong cryptography into a 
weak one by imposing international "key escrow" systems. Even cryptographic 
procedures that are currently considered as secure are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable. Major cryptography solutions widely used at the moment could be 
threatened and will definitely become obsolete in a near future.  
 
4.2 Need to encrypt data and to share secret keys 
Today optical fibres have replaced almost all copper links in worldwide digital 
communication networks. Optical fibres are thus often used to carry confidential 
information despite of intrinsic vulnerabilities. Intercepting information transmitted 
over an optical fibre is not only possible but also quite easy to do [2, 3]. As any 
telecommunication is intrinsically vulnerable to eavesdropping, cryptography is 
routinely used to protect data transmission in order to prevent eavesdroppers from 
being able to use the information that they capture.  
Cryptographic mechanisms contribute to offer data confidentiality. The word
"cryptography" comes from  Greek  meaning "secret writing"  - it is the science of 
concealing meaning. Cryptanalysis is the breaking of codes [4]. Cryptography is a 
deep mathematical subject, but this paragraph will retain only tow points: the need to 
use cryptographic keys and algorithms to be able to encrypt data. 
Whatever the cryptosystem is, for data communication confidentiality, sender and 
receiver have to use keys and cryptographic protocols to encrypt or decrypt a plain 
text [5]. 
There are two crucial moments to be considered when dealing with the encryption 
keys used to protect sensitive information: the key generation process and the 
key distribution process [6]. 
 
For the moment the key establishment problem is a crucial problem that the 
cryptography community has to face in order to propose truly secure confidentiality 
tools over unreliable transmission systems. 
The key generation process needs the generation of some truly random numbers and 
the key distribution process needs some “secure way” to transport the key between 
the sender and the receiver.  
In order to decrypt intercepted information, an eavesdropper has to obtain the key. As 
a rational person, he / she will concentrate all his effort either on the key generation 
process by guessing or deducing the key or on the key distribution process by trying 
to intercept the key during its exchange between the sender and the receiver. 
The strength of a cryptographic system depends on key length, key renewal rate, key 
entropy and key quality as well as on the cryptographic algorithm robustness [7]. 
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The robustness of any cryptographic system largely used over the Internet is based 
on mathematical procedures. Deep knowledge in mathematics associated with large 
computing power could in principle give ways to recover cryptographic keys during 
the keys distribution phase (keys exchange). That will completely compromise the 
data communication enciphered by such keys. Another issue related to cryptography 
is the lifetime of the information considered as confidential (secret).  
Breaking cryptographic mechanisms depends on the available computing power. It 
will be less and less difficult to achieve, regarding the growing computation capacities 
and grid availability. Key exchange is therefore vulnerable to technological progress. 
It means that even today the scheme remains only relatively secure and there is no 
guarantee about the future. What is appears mathematically unrealistic today may 
well be achieved tomorrow. 
Several questions arise when using cryptographic mechanisms, among them: 
• Will confidential data encrypted by classical cryptographic mechanisms still 
remain confidential in the long term?  
• How long will data considered as secure today stay confidential?  
• Can encrypted data remain secure being conscious that one can compromise 
the secret key? 
• How to generate pure random numbers in order to create non-predictable 
secret keys? 
At present, only quantum cryptography can contribute to answer these critical 
issues. 
The use of quantum cryptography for the distribution of secrets offers a leverage for 
achieving optimal security for the transmission of sensitive data [8]. The quantum 
security relies on the intrinsic secrecy of cryptographic keys guaranteed by quantum 
physics [9, 10]. This permits to reveal an eavesdropper’s presence by observing the 
amount of perturbation. If the perturbation stays below a certain bound, this is a proof 
of key confidentiality and integrity.  
With security based on physical laws rather than on hard algebraic problems, 
quantum cryptography is of the greatest interest to avoid breaking of the algorithm 
due to predictable and deterministic computer behaviour. Furthermore, security based 
on physical assumption is more stable as time passes than security based on 
computational assumptions [11] and will prevent several types of existing attacks. The 
stability of laws of physics gives highest guarantees to obviate all dangers related to 
technology evolution. Quantum cryptography can remain secure even in case that 
extremely powerful quantum computer would be available!  
Quantum cryptography allows placing security in a long run vision. 
Quantum cryptography complements conventional cryptographic techniques to 
raise security of data transmission to an unprecedented level. 
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4.3 Need for efficient tools to guarantee information security and satisfy 
conformance issues 
Several regulations like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [12] and the Basel II agreements 
[13] have recently emerged. These regulations are directly or indirectly related to the 
way information systems are organised and secured within the organization. They 
share some key concepts such as accountability, protection of personal private 
information, disclosure policies and integrity of reported information that for example 
can be linked to information security criteria. 
In fact, many regulations define some requirements concerning informational risks 
without specifying them in a more detailed way [14]. Regulatory compliance issues 
as well as responsibility and imputability will in the near future continue to rise in 
importance and will become more and more demanding regarding information 
security assurance [15]. 
More often, organisations consider the need for compliance as being a catalyst in 
resolving long-overlooked security problems but at the same time, the need to 
satisfy regulatory requirements increases information security management 
complexity level. 
To reduce the complexity of the management task, managers have to rely upon 
provable and reliable confidentiality technical tools [16]. Quantum cryptography 
can contribute to answer this issue.  
A risk management process has to consider all risk components in order to choose 
or to propose the most appropriate countermeasures. Being concerned by the costs 
that countermeasures generate, security managers have to make a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to spend limited resources appropriately to get good results [17]. 
This implies to be pro-active and means to reduce the risks and their impacts by 
decreasing the number of vulnerabilities. Reducing vulnerabilities is becoming the 
crucial part of risk management [18].  
• How can threats against cryptographic mechanisms be diminished?  
• How can vulnerabilities of data confidentiality be decreased?  
These issues can be solved by integrating quantum cryptography into existing 
security mechanisms [19-24].  
Researchers in the field consider quantum cryptography as the only true secure key-
distribution technology[25].  
 
4.4 Information security is a business enabler 
Organisations have to face the following security challenges: 
• to protect information and communication infrastructures; 
• to prevent information leakage,  
• to avoid information and communication technologies misuses or errors 
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(intentional or not); 
• to guarantee business continuity; 
• to keep security simple and cost effective. 
Because information security is a business enabler organizations have to protect the 
confidentiality of their digital assets in order to: 
• Prevent direct and indirect losses; 
• Avoid reputation damage; 
• Ensure business continuity; 
• Stay competitive. 
 
5 QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY IS AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION TO CLASSICAL 
CRYPTOGRAPHY LIMITATIONS 
 
5.1 Quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution (QKD) 
Quantum cryptography, or, more exactly, quantum key distribution (QKD) is the 
science that studies how to generate perfect random keys between two parties which 
are connected by a quantum channel [26]. The term quantum cryptography should be 
understood as quantum key distribution through this document. 
Quantum cryptography was not invented as solution to an urgent demand; rather it 
originated from pretty theoretical speculations on the power that is added to 
information theory by using quantum mechanical systems. Quite surprisingly, in the 
course of years, it turned into an increasingly interesting application of quantum 
mechanics that can have practical advantages for information technology [11].  
Quantum cryptography uses photons to transmit valuable information. According to 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (1927)1, it is not possible to observe a quantum 
object without modifying it. Linked to the very quantum physical characteristics of a 
photon, these properties are used to verify and certify that the information-photon has 
not been eavesdropped upon or intercepted [9, 10]. The photons are subsequently 
used to generate and exchange secrets (keys) between two remote sites through an 
optical fibre link, confirming thus their secrecy.  
In telecommunication networks, light is routinely used to exchange information, but 
encoding the value of a digital bit on a single light photon to create a secret key then 
used to encrypt sensitive data to be exchanged is an innovation in generating and 
distributing secrets [27]. For each bit of information, pulses containing a single photon 
are emitted and sent through an optical fibre to the receiver. The deciphering task is 
impossible for any eavesdropper because if the eavesdropper wants to obtain the 
value of a bit he or she must observe the photon. By doing so, the eavesdropper will 
                                                          
1 http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08.htm 
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disturb the quantum system and reveal his or her presence.  
One of the crucial features of the key, the length, is totally flexible in the case of 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). This flexibility is also the case in classical 
cryptography, but the advantage is that by the use of QKD, the time needed for key 
generation is not affected by exponential increase as it is for longer asymmetrical 
keys. This advantage relies on the fact that QKD is a point-to-point primitive using a 
symmetric cryptographic key distribution mechanism with highest security level. With 
quantum cryptography the objective of using real random numbers and random 
processes is reached. This increases the transmission security level and obviates the 
need to increase the complexity of the key – it is provably secure against any attack 
irrespective of available computing power or the availability of any other resources.  
 “Quantum cryptography can benefit from the perfect secrecy offered by the One-
Time-Pad function and from the fact that the keys established by QKD are 
unconditionally secure, the messages exchanged over such unconditionally secure 
links enjoy one security property that can be called “everlasting secrecy” [10]. 
Quantum cryptography has the potential to complement conventional cryptographic 
techniques to raise the security of data transmission fibre links to an unprecedented 
level. It is considered as one of the ten technologies that will change the world.2   
Quantum cryptography security is always relying on an implicit assumption that the 
persons who want to communicate with each other must be located inside safe 
environments and belong to a trusted circle. 
Quantum cryptography technology has not been intensively tested or attacked and in 
the same time validated by a large number of users. A strong historical security is 
rather difficult to claim since very few organizations have yet implemented quantum 
cryptography in their security systems 
 
5.2 A case study example  
Luxembourg is a small country, which does not exceed 100 km of length and 57 km 
of width. However there are over 200 banks, 1785 collective investments in 
transferable securities (UCITS) and more than 142 other financial related 
organisations3.  
The service sector is the most important sector within Luxembourg’s economy. 
Something like 100 billion of dollars is the net benefit of the financial market of 
Luxembourg. According to its importance within the worldwide financial market, 
Luxembourg is focusing a lot on the inter banks transactions market which is the 
fourth in size in Europe. On the other hand Luxembourg is considered as a very 
privileged place for private banking. This is based principally on informational assets 
and on data and transaction confidentiality. Relying upon strong confidentiality 
mechanisms to protect secrets is a major concern for all economic actors of 
Luxembourg’s financial place and for the overall economy of the country. Recent 
details of significant security breaches in every day financial business, where millions 
of dollars have been lost, reinforce the need for more robust security to protect 
                                                          
2 MIT technology Review, February 2003 and Newsweek, July 7 2003 
3 Source http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/rap-info/i2311-51.asp 
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information on transmission. Considering all these characteristics of such an 
important financial market, an inherently secure communication network is required. 
Luxembourg as financial place could benefit from operating quantum security. Due to 
the limited specific geographic environment of Luxembourg, distance limitation of 
quantum key distribution should not be any more a concern. 
Banks can actually use quantum cryptography in the following types of transaction: 
bank building to another bank building of the same bank company or/and cash 
dispenser to the bank, assuming the fact that the distance connecting the remote 
points is less than 100 km. So, the use of quantum cryptography based on optical 
fibre is possible. 
In this case, either a big amount of data could be exchanged or a tiny amount of data 
that could be transmitted frequently between systems. Transmission from cash 
dispenser to bank (if the cash dispenser is not in the bank itself) can also be done 
using quantum cryptography based on optical fibre to avoid the danger that a 
malicious person could intercept the communication between the bank and the cash 
dispenser and modify it (e.g. credit some bank account or change the identification of 
the debited account). 
Integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted data could then be ensured by the use 
of transactions secured with quantum cryptography. 
Because quantum cryptography allows securing encrypted links, it can be used also 
to design highly secure virtual private networks (VPN) [22].  
 
5.3 A real quantum cryptographic networks: SECOQC QKD Network 
The presentation of the SECOQC quantum-cryptographic network marks the 
successful termination of the project after four and a half years (Vienna October 8th, 
2008).  
Several typical applications, like telephony and video conferencing are secured with 
cryptographic keys distributed over a QKD network with six nodes and eight links. 
The node modules are provided by their developer, Austrian Research Center in 
Vienna, and, the optical fibre infrastructure is provided by Siemens Austria. QKD 
Links come from five different technologies: Plug-and-Play system by idQuantique 
from Geneve/Switzerland, Coherent One-Way system from GAP Optique, Geneva, 
Switzerland and Austrian Research Center, Continuous-Variables system from 
Centre national de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and THALES Research and 
Technology, both from Paris, France, One Way Weak Pulse System from Toshiba 
Research of UK, as well as an Entangled Photons system from University Vienna and 
Austrian Research Centers. The logical topology of the system is a square with 
diagonals plus one further long link. Average distance between the nodes is between 
20 and 30 kilometres, with the longest link of 83 kilometres [28]. 
The network is of the trusted repeater type with a special emphasis on the 
development of the network architecture and the corresponding protocols [29]. The 
SECOQC network is solely used for the creation of secure Keys and their distribution 
to the intended receivers. The so-called ‘Network of Secrets’ is organised in three 
layers, being QKD link layer, transport layer, and network layer.  
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Key creation and distribution is completely hidden in the lowest layer. A distributed 
management and routing system provides availability through redundancy of paths 
through the network, as well as traffic and congestion control. With so called ‘secret 
sharing’, i.e. the selection of disjunctive paths for different portions of the 
cryptographic keys, with recombination of the final key only at its final destination, 
trust assumptions on single nodes of the trusted repeater network can even be 
relaxed.. A central design feature of the SECOQC Network of Secrets is that 
cryptographic keys are stored and managed in dedicated key stores that are 
implemented in the so-called node module of the network node, and not in the single 
point-to-point links, which enables the keys on a network level. This node module also 
provides the public channel for all nodes originating (or ending) in the node, and its 
cryptographic functionality, like authentication and encryption on request [28].  
 
6 USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY: SOME ADVANTAGES AND LIMITS 
 
6.1 Building confidence 
Organizations that offer a reliable security level will have easiness to build a trusty 
relationship with its stakeholders, partners or clients. Quantum cryptography will 
contribute to develop confidence and to raise practical market related advantages. 
 
6.2 Being in regulatory conformity  
Several regulations have emerged during the last years in several activity sectors that 
constrain institutions to be in conformity with them. The obligation to respect certain 
legal constraints relevant to information technologies security insists on the need for 
implementing efficient security measures. Mention can be made for examples of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act [12], Basel II accord [13], Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) [30], 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [31], EU’s Privacy and 
Electronic Communications (Directive 2002/58) [32], the Data Protection Directive 
(Directive 95/46/EC)[33], and EuroSox [34].  
Confidentiality and integrity of data is most often required by these regulations without 
specifying the kind of technology to be used. Adopting Quantum Cryptography can be 
a solution to certify that information is correctly protected and satisfy legal compliance 
to “protect informational assets in the best way [12]. 
 
6.3 Having a long term vision and being effective 
Using quantum cryptography gives the opportunity to invest into a technology with a 
high potential of remaining secure for a long time.  
Working with a security long run vision places an organization in a higher competitive 
stage than others. 
Quantum cryptography contributes to giving enterprises and organisations a real 
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competitive advantage.  
Knowing that quantum cryptography is reliable allows management attention to be 
focused on other problems.  
Quantum cryptography related costs can be balanced with security efficiency in the 
long term. 
Quantum cryptography contributes to fulfil the objective to have better security without 
having a great amount of added costs. 
 
6.4 Being now at a better security level   
Being able to conduct business with a much higher level of confidentiality than the 
competitors, will lead to several advantages generating direct and indirect profit [35]. 
The use of an inherently secure way to communicate should state that the 
organization using quantum cryptography is not anymore at the same level of 
insecurity as its competitors [6].  
 
6.5 Avoiding a security gap  
A digital security gap will be amplified between those who use quantum cryptography 
and those who do not.  
 
6.6 Improving some limitations  
Being a technology, quantum cryptography naturally presents some limits which are 
subject to an ongoing process of improvement.   
In the current stage, the low-key exchange rates constitute a limit. Albeit current rates 
in the range of kilobits per second already permit to be operational, the performance 
of single QKD links increases. The combination of QKD with classical symmetric 
cryptography helps in this direction. Short distances are also a concern today but the 
distances are constantly growing and as stated above the system is already 
operational thanks to the use of the network approach with trusted repeater stations. 
This is a very useful approach for metropolitan area size networks, which would be 
the initial applications of quantum cryptography [28]. 
The implementation of a quantum cryptography network is expensive, like any other 
innovation’s implementation, but it does not consume disruption costs as it can be 
deployed in parallel to existing key distribution channels. Actually, the quantum 
cryptography network implementation costs are principally concentrated on hardware 
or device related costs, which are not as expensive as administrative costs of a 
service disruption or a service upgrading to another technology. In all the cases, a 
quantum cryptography network offers a long run service with dedicated 
implementation costs being easily redeemable [25].  
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QKD network implementation needs dedicated dark fibre currently. With up to 1000 
strands in contemporary fibres, dedicated fibres are not a very costly problem. In spite 
of this, the future development could allow the use of wavelength-division multiplexing 
(WDM). It is a technology to multiplex multiple optical carrier signals on a single 
optical fibre by using different wavelengths (colours) of laser light to carry different 
signals. This allows a multiplication in capacity, in addition of making it possible to 
perform bidirectional communication over one strand of fibre. 
Apart from the mentioned advantageous features, quantum key distribution (QKD) 
links have some limitations: the distance over which keys can be exchanged is 
roughly limited by 100 kilometres today and potentially up to 200 kilometres in the 
future. The key generation rate exponentially decreases with distance and is currently 
limited to several tens of Kilohertz. Also is the direct point-to-point nature of QKD links 
susceptible to denial of service attacks, once the connecting optical fibre is severed. 
To overcome the previously mentioned limitations in distance, rate, and availability, 
most recent developments go in the direction of building redundant networks out of 
QKD links. These can be realized either as ‘full quantum network’, where quantum 
signals are refreshed in the network nodes using so-called quantum repeaters [36] 
[37] or as ‘classical trusted relaying network’. Quantum repeaters however are merely 
theoretical constructs by now as they require elaborated quantum operations and 
especially quantum memories which are neither available today, nor are expected to 
be available in a foreseeable future. Trusted relay networks, on the other hand, can 
be implemented with today’s technologies. They follow a simple principle: local keys 
are generated over QKD links and then stored in the nodes on both ends of the link – 
the trusted relays. The key distribution between distant (not directly connected) nodes 
is performed over a QKD path, i.e. a one-dimensional chain of trusted relays 
connected by QKD links. Secret keys are forwarded, in a hop-by-hop fashion, along 
the QKD path. End-to-end information theoretic security is thus obtained between the 
end nodes, provided that the intermediary nodes can be trusted. Trusted relay 
networks can be used to build wide area QKD networks – but the assumption of 
trusted nodes has certain implications on how these networks can be used for 
electronic commerce. This network paradigm with multiple links originating from one 
network node can overcome distance limitations of QKD, as well as capacity and 
availability limitations through redundant paths [28]. 
 
6.7 Cost model  
Proposing a real cost model for network architecture solutions is very difficult because 
each case is particular and has to answer a special well identified need. Quantum 
cryptography is nowadays affordably compatible to the requirement of high-speed 
networks and of high security level. 
Is quantum cryptography expensive?  
It depends on what “expensive” does mean in a particular context. Currently adopting 
a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology has a good Return on Investment 
(RoI) for many reasons: 
• QKD will remain secure for a long time because of its physical properties; 
• there is no need for frequent upgrades which is a very expensive aspect in a long 
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run vision; 
• there is no disruption of business during upgrade, which is more expensive than 
QKD by itself. 
The implementation of a new and innovative technology could generate costs due 
principally to hardware costs. But it is not to be neglected that costs can be reduced 
in the long term by massive market adoption. 
Some consider Quantum Cryptography as approximately twice as expensive as 
classical cryptography. Most products are attractive in terms of costs because of 
scalability properties and effectiveness. Adopting quantum technologies to secure 
point-to-point connections between two distributed buildings is possible in a range of 
cost comparable to other existing solutions4.  
 
6.8 A market and industrial perspective 
Quantum cryptography has great potential to become a key technology for securing 
communication confidentiality and privacy in the future information society and thus to 
become a driver for the success of a series of services in the field of e-government, e-
commerce, and e-health [38]. Several studies have already demonstrated the need to 
have pro-active security and efficient security countermeasure [15, 39] to face the 
challenges linked to ICT misuses and cybercrime issues [40-43] because quantum 
technology has the potential to break the vicious circle between the fight between 
code makers and code breakers. 
A quantum industry has recently emerged [44] and reliable actors already exist and 
propose technologies and services. 
“The USA Department of Defense (DoD) currently funds several quantum-
cryptography projects as part of a $20.6 million initiative in quantum information. 
Globally, public and private sources will fund about $50 million in quantum-
cryptography work over the next several years. Andrew Hammond, a vice president of 
MagiQ, estimates that the market for QKD systems will reach $200 million within a 
few years, and one day could hit $1 billion annually”5. 
 
6.9 Social impacts  
The use of quantum key distribution for robust secret transmission will change the 
actual network security paradigm. This will affect without precedence the way to build 
trust among distributed actors.  
                                                          
4 For example : A typical point-to-point link configuration (considering a Quantum Key 
Distribution device and the link) costs about 65’000 €. Securing two remote points will cost 
about 130’000 €. This price is subject to decrease with the number of links to be connected 
and it is subject to change from one quantum technology provider to another.  Source : 
IdQuantique products (www.idquantique.com/).  
5 Source :http://www.aip.org/tip/INPHFA/vol-10/iss-6/p22.html American Institute of Physics – 
December 2004/January 2005 
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The information society, as the development of an efficient digital economy, could not 
exist without strong security mechanisms. Quantum security technology can 
contribute to build confidence in the use of ICT's. It will enforce the consumers’ 
willingness to use electronic services and develop economic activities for the benefit 
of all [45].  
More and more e-voting applications are under development worldwide. Some 
initiatives have been already implemented and are in use.  
The citizen e-voting information integrity cannot be guaranteed without integration of 
at least the pure random number generation possible with quantum technology to 
generate cryptographic keys for the e-voting process. In this particular e-government 
context, achieving strong security through efficient key generation and distribution is 
mandatory to support the democratic process6.  
 
7 STANDARDISATION OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY AND QUANTUM 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
7.1 Standardisation in SECOQC: An ETSI answer 
In the course of the SECOQC project, the need for standardisation arose only 
gradually when we were confronted with the need to combine five technologically 
different quantum cryptographic key distribution link technologies in the SECOQC 
Quantum Back Bone network. A common interface was developed and published as 
open standard. Documentation and software emulator are available on the 
www.secoqc.net homepage. In addition, standardised components and assumptions 
are indispensable for the definition and development of effective and reliable security 
metrics for the security evaluation of quantum cryptographic systems [28].  
Together with the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI, the 
University of Lausanne in close collaboration with Austrian Research Centers ARC 
developed the plan to initiate an Industry Specification Group (ISG) [46]. 
The ISG7 on Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Technologies has been founded 
on July 2008 to bring together relevant actors from science, industry, and commerce 
from Europe and from abroad. Among the initial consortium of signatories are the 
Austrian Research Centers ARC, Telefonica S.A., Polytechnical University Madrid, 
TELECOM Paris Tech, Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba Research Europe, idQuantique 
S.A., SmartQuantum, Quinetiq Ventures, University of Lausanne, and with pending 
application process (by the time of Sept 2008): Thales S.A., European Space Agency, 
Swisscom, Mimas Berhad, Istituto Nazionale di Ricerca Metrologica.   
Overall goal of the ETSI – ISG initiative is to offer an open forum with significant 
leverage effects on coordination, cooperation and convergence. Communication 
between producers, developers, and scientists on the one side, and prospective 
customers and users on the other side shall help to promote mutual understanding. 
To achieve these goals, two separate tracks, one for business application and one for 
                                                          
6  http://www.ge.ch/evoting/ (online 30.09.2008) 
7 http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/NewsandEvents/ISG_QKD.aspx (online 30.09.2008) 
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technical standards will be initiated. 
Standardisation activities can support the commercialisation of quantum cryptography 
on various levels and stages. Gaps on requirements, technology, and application 
level, which are still prevalent in today’s quantum cryptographic systems shall be 
narrowed and eventually closed. 
Business standards deal with standardisation issues that are not entirely focused on 
technology. They are concerned with the analysis of business requirements for 
different groups of prospective users, as well as with the development and definition 
of suitable interfaces to guarantee connectivity to existing infrastructures and 
compatibility to existing service management [47]. Of specific interest is the 
application interface over which key requests are issued to a quantum cryptographic 
key distribution link, or network, and over which subsequently the generated and 
distributed keys are handed back to the application. These issues will be addressed 
by a technical standardization process. 
 
7.2 Standards to fulfil business requirements 
There are different groups of prospective users for quantum key distribution systems, 
who all may impose different requirements on these systems. These requirements 
are in most cases imposed by compulsory security policies that reflect the 
respective security need for such classes of users. Example user groups are banks, 
governmental institutions, and health institutions. The ISO/EN 15408 ‘Common 
Criteria’ standard [48-50] provides a suitable formalism, the Protection Profile, to lay 
down implementation independent security objectives for quantum cryptographic 
systems as they are required from a business point of view.  
The security objectives defined for quantum key distribution systems in the Technical 
Standards track must match the security objectives of the requirements for a certain 
user group. The use of the same formalism helps to mediate developers and users – 
i.e. to bring them more into contact so that they learn about their respective technical 
possibilities and business needs. 
 
7.3 Technical Standards for quantum key distribution (QKD) 
Standardized interfaces are needed in order to allow a quantum cryptographic key 
exchange system to be attached to existing information communication technology 
systems. Classical (i.e. non-quantum) key exchange systems are available on the 
market and are widely used to exchange keys for securing data transfer.  
These systems do in general employ Diffie-Hellman style asymmetrical key 
exchange. Quantum cryptographic systems replacing such asymmetrical key 
exchange subsystems shall be compatible to these interfaces. In course of this task, 
a collection of interfaces relevant for quantum cryptographic systems shall be 
compiled, and the feasibility of adapting interfaces to specific characteristics of 
quantum key exchange shall be analysed .The main goal of this track is to progress 
towards technical standards for quantum key distribution systems.  
One task is the development of quantum key distribution systems specifications ‘from 
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bottom up’, i.e. from what is already realised in contemporarily available quantum key 
distribution links and networks. Furthermore, properties of specific macroscopic 
quantum optical components, like photon sources and detectors, and interfaces 
between components of quantum cryptographic systems shall be subject to 
standardisation. This shall facilitate better compatibility between components of 
different origin in single quantum key distribution links. 
Quantum key distribution links usually consist of single modular components, which 
can be clearly distinguished from other components of the system. Examples for such 
components are: photon sources, photon detectors, or the computers or embedded 
systems, which perform the key distillation. For these components it is useful to 
define standardised security properties, like e.g. multi photon pulse probabilities for 
single photon sources. 
In addition, it is necessary to agree on common interfaces for modular components, in 
order to facilitate the integration of components of different vendors. This activity shall 
be complementary to the standardisation of components as regarding to physical and 
security related properties. Together, these measures shall reduce development effort 
for quantum cryptographic systems significantly. 
 
7.4 Quantum key distribution security specification 
The ISO/EN 15408 ‘Common Criteria’ standard can also be used for technically 
detailed quantum key distribution security specifications. They contain a threat 
and risk analysis for the assets that are to be protected in the system (the produced 
keys). Based upon this analysis, a number of security objectives shall be derived, 
which again are to be maintained during operation of the quantum cryptographic 
system. Consequently, specific functional requirements for actual implementations of 
quantum cryptographic systems shall be developed and listed. These low level 
specifications shall provide guidance for developers and manufacturers of quantum 
cryptographic systems who may develop and produce their systems in accordance to 
these specifications. 
At a later instant of time, security evaluations by accredited evaluation laboratories 
may be conducted to prove the concordance between security specifications and 
implemented systems (accreditation). 
In the ontology of the ‘Common Criteria’ such implementation dependent security 
specifications are so-called ‘Security Targets’ – in contrast to the above mentioned 
implementation independent Protection Profiles. Ideally the Security Targets (bottom-
up specifications – ‘what we can deliver’) meet with the Protection Profiles (top-
down specifications – ‘what we need’). Thus it shall be ensured that a quantum 
cryptographic system delivers exactly what an interest group requires. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
Achieving confidentiality is one of the cornerstones of security measures, which 
could be fulfilled by cryptographic implementations. The reliability and robustness of 
the cryptographic mechanisms essentially rely upon cryptographic keys (key 
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generation, distribution and storage, key secrecy). With the increase of computational 
power contemporary encryption and decryption methods based on secret keys for 
securing communication are under threat. Information becomes a very important 
asset for today’s organizations, which are more and more subject to regulatory 
compliance issues. Added to the fact that information security officers could be 
accountable for a lack of sufficient information security measures (civil and penal 
responsibilities) they have to rely upon strong technical security solutions. The 
security problems related to classical encryption methods may no longer satisfy the 
requirement for a strong security level. Quantum cryptography contributes to 
answering these needs. 
Cryptographic solutions must support reliable and provable confidentiality services to 
support today’s business competition and effectiveness in an uncertain world. It has 
been demonstrated that if underling cryptographic mechanisms are based on 
computational assumptions, they are no longer sufficiently secure. The only possibility 
to bypass this fact is to change the cryptographic paradigms by integrating quantum 
theory into cryptographic solutions to exploit its inherent secure mechanisms. 
Rethinking fundamentals in cryptography is the only solution to develop a new vision 
of security for the benefit of transactions that are critical for institutions and people. 
This allows introducing a break into the vicious circle, which assumes that only the 
entity that offers commercial security solutions can master institutions’ data 
confidentiality. With quantum key distribution, institutions and people have for the 
first time the means to be sure that their data are under their own control and 
cannot be obtained by eavesdroppers without knowledge of sender or 
recipient. 
Adopting quantum random number generators can be a first step to enforce actual 
cryptographic robustness in every day transactions. This can be done very easily and 
is cost effective. The second move towards high security is to transmit confidential 
data trough point-to-point connections secured by the combination of quantum 
key distribution and strong classical encryption algorithms. This choice has 
already been made for high value applications and long term secure data retention by 
leading institutions that are security aware in order to obtain a strong competitive 
advantages in the market. 
The last step towards a truly secure network environment will be realised when 
organisation will design their network architecture based upon quantum cryptographic 
network solutions. The feasibility of this approach has been demonstrated in October 
2008 by the SECOQC consortium in an experimental deployment of a quantum 
cryptographic network with several nodes and links in Vienna. This experiment 
demonstrates a realistic prototype contributing to conceive innovative networks that 
integrate an intrinsic confidence level.  
The SECOQC quantum cryptographic network shows that transferring quantum key 
distribution from the controlled and well-defined laboratory environment into a real-
world commercial environment is possible. This concerns the development of 
networked structures, which better meet the requirements of different prospective 
user groups, as well as the development of standardised procedures for generating 
and enabling trust into quantum cryptography systems. 
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9 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
9.1 Do I need quantum cryptography?  
That depends on the importance given to informational assets. Two important components 
have to be considered: 
• The security level the currently mechanism offer,  
• The value of the information to be protected and security criteria to be fulfilled. 
In some critical infrastructures like governmental and administrative applications, financial 
domains, energy sector installations etc. the need of a robust technology offering a high 
security level is something mandatory.  
Taking into account that computer power drastically increases in a continuous way and that 
there is no mathematical proof of its cryptographic algorithms’ robustness, asymmetrical 
cryptography could be considered as potentially insecure in the near future. 
 
9.2 Do international regulations require the use of quantum cryptography? 
No regulation requires explicitly the use of quantum cryptography but regulations (such as 
SoX and Basel II) regarding the financial domain require exactitude and reliability for the 
financial statement. However what is required is to protect informational assets in the best 
way, which could be differently interpreted according to the context. Quantum cryptography is 
a solution satisfying legal compliance and certifying that information is correctly protected. 
 
9.3 Is QKD expensive?  
It depends on what “expensive” does mean in a particular context. Currently, adopting a QKD 
technology has a good Return On Investment for many reasons: 
• QKD will remain secure for a long time because of its physical properties; 
• there is no need for frequent upgrades which is a very expensive aspect in a long run 
vision; 
• there is no disruption of business during upgrade, which is more expensive than QKD 
itself. 
The implementation of a new and innovative technology could generate cost due principally to 
hardware costs.  
But it is not to be neglected that cost can be reduced in the long term by massive market 
adoption. 
 
9.4 Why do I need to change my present cryptographic system?  
First of all you do not need to change your present cryptographic system. QKD is for 
generating and distributing secure keys for your existing cryptographic applications, but also 
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for your future applications. In that way the adoption of a QKD will improve significantly the 
quality and the security level of communication. 
 
9.5 How to integrate quantum cryptography in my existing IT infrastructure?  
The high speed QKD system can be integrated into a fibre optical telecom infrastructure, such 
as a Local Area Networks (LAN) or Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) to enable secure 
communication and information exchange among users. 
It could be installed in parallel to the running system, and then eventually been plugged in. 
Another way is to wrap the QKD system around your existing systems. 
 
9.6 Does QKD need dedicated optical fibre?  
QKD’s network implementation needs dedicated fibre currently. With up to 1000 strands in 
contemporary fibres, dedicated fibres are not a very costly problem. In spite of this, the future 
development could allow the use of wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM). It is a 
technology, which multiplexes multiple optical carrier signals on a single optical fibre by using 
different wavelengths (colours) of laser light to carry different signals. This allows a 
multiplication in capacity, in addition to enabling bidirectional communications over one strand 
of fibre. 
Alternatively, free space QKD can be applied where photons are exchanged between two 
telescopes (see below). 
 
9.7 Is it possible to use QKD on a copper fibre?  
QKD explicitly cannot be use on copper fibre, but the use of a quantum number generator to 
design a key session (as described in the e-voting application of the Geneva Canton - CH) is 
possible over a copper fibre. 
 
9.8 Is QKD possible in free space?  
The possibility to operate QKD in free space was demonstrated on multiple occasions (1998: 1 
km in the US, 2001: 1.9 km in the UK, 2002: 10 km in the USA). In 2003 photons were 
exchanged in the Alps in Germany at a distance of 23 km. In 2005 it was reported that 
Chinese scientists succeeded in an inner-city free-space distribution of entangled photon pairs 
over a distance of 10.5 km. About the same time, an experiment was published where 
entangled photons were distributed directly through the atmosphere to a receiver station in 7.8 
km distance in the City of Vienna. In 2007 a quantum key was established between ESA-
telescopes on two of the Canary Islands over a distance of 144 km. The quality of the free 
space transmission is highly depending on atmospheric conditions. 
 
9.9 Is it possible to use QKD within a Local Area Network (LAN)?  
A local area network implementation of QKD is already operational to connect one or more 
remote sites by a QKD link. The transmission distance can be increased beyond 100 km by 
chaining links. 
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9.10 What is the distance limitation?  
For a point-to-point connection the distance limitation is about 100 km in order to obtain 
reliable quality of the signal. The SECOQC’s network architecture allows to overpass this 
physical constraint and to extend the capacity of QKD transmission over a wide area network 
(WAN).  
 
9.11 Which are the principal domains in which a QKD network might be useful? 
Quantum key generation and distribution answer high security needs and can for example be 
used to secure transmissions in the following areas: 
• Government or military entities 
• Banks and financial institutions (Interbank-Transfer, communications Bank to ATM,…); 
• Critical infrastructures,  
• Telecoms operators; 
• Airports; 
• Etc. 
 
9.12 Can end users benefit from quantum cryptography? 
Any end user disposing of an optical fibre infrastructure can benefit from the Quantum 
Cryptography advantages to enhance the security level of their transmission. 
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